Volume 23
Issue 3 Symposium on Environmental Management: The Policy Perspective
Summer 1983

Money Damages for Regulatory Takings
Janice D. Paster

Recommended Citation
Janice D. Paster, Money Damages for Regulatory Takings, 23 Nat. Resources J. 711 (1983).
Available at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/nrj/vol23/iss3/17

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UNM Digital Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Natural Resources Journal by an authorized editor of UNM Digital Repository. For more
information, please contact amywinter@unm.edu, lsloane@salud.unm.edu, sarahrk@unm.edu.

MONEY DAMAGES FOR REGULATORY 'TAKINGS'

ZONING-UNCONSTITUTIONAL TAKINGS WITHOUT JUST
COMPENSATION, DAMAGES: An owner deprived temporarily of
any economical use of property by a zoning regulation can claim
damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because the property was taken
for public use without just compensation. Hernandez v. City of Lafayette, 643 F.2d 1188 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied - U.S. -_, 102
S.Ct. 1251 (1982).

Hernandez v. City of Lafayette' ended a half-century of debate about
whether the excessive use of police power in a zoning regulation could
lead to damages for an unconstitutional taking of private property for
public use without just compensation.' The Fifth Circuit opinion confirmed that an unconstitutional taking could be distinguished from a due
process violation resulting in invalidation of the challenged regulation.
According to Hernandez a taking occurs when an owner is denied any
economical use of his land in violation of the property clause of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments. The Hernandez opinion relied upon Judge
Brennan's controversial dissent in San Diego Gas and Electric Co. v.
City of San Diego3 to establish that a regulatory taking required the
payment of damages.' The Fifth Circuit extended San Diego by holding
that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 afforded a cause of action in federal court for a
plaintiff seeking such relief. Neither court applied due process analysis
to reach its result. Both adopted a standard for a Fifth Amendment uncompensated taking, although the Hernandez test placed greater weight
on a reduction in property value, while San Diego relied more heavily
on a concern for fairness to the property owner. The assessment of damages against cities may place a considerable financial burden on local
1. 643 F.2d 1188 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied - U.S. -,
102 S.Ct. 1251 (1982).
2. Berger, A Policy Analysis of the Taking Problem, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 165, 166 (1974); Fulham
& Scharf, Inverse Condemnation: Its Availability in Challengingthe Validity of a Zoning Ordinance,
26 STAN. L. REV. 1439, 1445-46 (1974); Ryckman, Land Use Litigation, FederalJurisdiction
and the Abstention Doctrines, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 377, 387-88 (1981); Van Alstyne, Taking or
Damaging by Police Power: The Searchfor Inverse Condemnation Criteria, 44 S. CAL. L. REV.
1, 13-14 (1971).
3. 450 U.S. 621 (1981).
4. The relevant portions of the 5th Amendment read "No person ... shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation." The 5th Amendment is applied to the states through the due process
clause of the 14th Amendment.
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governments, resulting in a negative impact on planned growth in the
future.
THE HERNANDEZ CASE
Plaintiff James Hernandez filed a § 1983 claim 5 ifi
federal district court
in March of 1979 after repeated attempts to rezone sixteen acres of land
inthe City of Lafayette, Louisiana. 6 The plot was zoned for single family
residential use, although it abutted a sewage treatment plant. The local
planning commission recommended changes on several occasions starting
in 1975, but the City Council failed to act affirmatively on the recommendation during the succeeding two and one-half years. One city councilman stated on the record that the City might have to pay more for a
planned right-of-way across the Hernandez property if the Council approved a zoning change. After three years the Council did pass a zoning
change, but the Mayor vetoed it. Hernandez then sought to compel a
zoning change in state court and by mid-1979 reached a settlement agreement with the city. The agreement fell through when the Mayor refused
to sign it. Shortly thereafter the Council passed another rezoning ordinance, but again the Mayor vetoed the bill. When Hernandez filed in
federal court in 1979, the state claim was
pending and the land remained
7
zoned for single family residential use.
In federal court, Hernandez filed a § 1983 action claiming that the
City's zoning ordinance and its failure to rezone his land had deprived
him of property without due process of law and without just compensation
under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.8 The district court held that
the City was immune from the § 1983 claim because the alleged deprivation resulted from City inaction, not from affirmative action, and because there was no valid claim of discrimination or equal protection. 9
The court held that the Mayor had absolute legislative immunity under
§ 1983 because he was acting in a legislative capacity. '0
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the judgment in favor of the Mayor, but
reversed as to the City."I To reach the 5th Amendment claims, the circuit
court held that there was no absolute immunity for municipalities under
§ 1983, even though immunity did attach to the Mayor acting in a leg2 The court held that a government entity taking property
islative capacity. 1
5. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1978).

6. 643 F.2d at 1191.
7. Id.
8. Id.at 1189.
9. Id.at 1191.
10. Id.at 1191-92.
11. Id.at 1190.
12. Id.at 1193-94, 1196.
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for public use by a zoning regulation must pay just compensation for the
effective period of the. taking. The taking begins when the municipality
has notice of the deprivation and ends when it chooses to rescind or
amend the regulation. 13 However, fluctuations in value of the property
during the time that the municipality reviews and corrects the ordinance
are mere incidents of ownership unless there is extraordinary delay. 14 The
Fifth Circuit Court remanded the case to the federal district court to
determine whether the City had denied plaintiff Hernandez any viable
economic use of his property. If it had, Hernandez must receive damages
equal to just compensation for the value of the property during the period
of the taking. 15
THE ROAD TO HERNANDEZ
Theoretically, a property owner can challenge a zoning regulation either
as a violation of due process or as an uncompensated taking. In practice
courts rarely distinguish the two claims and merely invalidate a questioned
regulation on "due process" grounds. ' 6 The property owner must show
that the regulation unfairly interferes with the beneficial use and enjoyment of his property to prove either claim. In both, the courts weigh
private rights and the public interest to make a determination of fairness.
In the early years of the twentieth century, municipalities turned increasingly to zoning ordinances to plan the orderly development of land
within their borders. 17 Early justifications for zoning relied on the law of
nuisance: the government regulated private uses of land which interfered
with the rights of others to enjoy the benefits of their own property.
Government regulation could protect the right of citizens to be free from
the noxious operation of liquor establishments or fertilizer works in their
13. Id. at 1200.
14. Id. at 1201.
15. Id. In April of 1981 the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeals determined that the City
had not deprived Hernandez of "all practical use" of his property and that therefore the denial of a
zoning change was "not unreasonable, arbitrary or a denial of due process of law." The federal
district court then granted the City summary judgment on the grounds of res judicata and collateral
estoppel. On appeal the Fifth Circuit held that the ruling was correct. 649 F.2d 337 (1981). Such
claims were affirmative defenses which must be pled in the trial court. The 5th Circuit refused
speculation on whether res judicata or collateral estoppel would be valid affirmative defenses against
the uncompensated takings claim.
16. Bumgardner, "Takings" Under the Police Power-The Development of Inverse Condemnation
As a Method of Challenging Zoning Ordinances, 30 S.W.L.J. 723, 725 (1976). For examples see
I NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN § 1.42(1) (3rd. rev. ed. 1975); 6 NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN § 6.2 (3rd. rev. ed. 1980); Kratovil & Harrison, Eminent Domain-Policy and Concept, 42
CALIF. L. REV. 596, 608-09 (1954); Haley, Balancing Private Loss'Against Public Gain to Test
for a Violation of Due Process or a Taking Without Just Compensation, 54 WASH. L. REV. 315,
325 n. 47 (1979).
17. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Co., 272 U.S. 365, 386 (1926).
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own neighborhoods.' 8 Eventually, zoning became a powerful tool used
by city governments to plan for orderly growth. Zoning ordinances established residential, commercial, and industrial sectors within their borders in order to protect the public interest.19
Zoning regulations affected property values and the use to which an
owner could put any particular piece of property. One response to a
detrimental zoning regulation was to challenge it on due process grounds.
The landowner claimed that the government regulation was arbitrary,
unreasonable, or excessive.20 The courts asked whether the ordinance
served a valid public purpose within the police power of the legislating
body; then they inquired whether the means employed bore a rational
relationship to the achievement of those objectives. Often this determination required a balancing of private loss by the property owner against
public gain;2 mere reduction in the value of land due to a zoning regulation
was not sufficient to violate due process. Sometimes there was no due
process violation because courts reasoned that the property owner himself
derived benefits from the orderly use of land; thus, the owner received
"compensation" from a regulation enacted in the public interest. 22 However, courts agreed that excessive or arbitrary use of the police power
through a zoning regulation did violate due process and thus would bring
the invalidation of the regulation.
A property owner might also challenge a government zoning regulation
as an uncompensated taking of property for public purposes. Here the
courts had no clear test to apply. Again, a mere reduction in the value
of the land did not equal an uncompensated taking. 2 3 In some cases the
courts judged the reduction in value to be substantial and even very close
to complete, and still found no violation of the takings clause. 24 Justice
Holmes' famous opinion in Pennsylvania Coal v. Mabon25 suggested that
18. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 669-70 (1887); Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U.S. 659,
667 (1878).
19. See Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 125-26 (1978).
20. 272 U.S. 365, 397.
21. Haley, supra note 16 at320.
22. 438 U.S. at 147.
23. Fulham, supra note Iat 1439.
24. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); Sax, Takings and the Police Power,
74 YALE L. J. 36, 51-53 (1964); Ryckman, supra note 2 at 379, 388-89.
25. 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). The Pennsylvania Coal Co. conveyed to the plaintiff the right to
the surface of certain land, but expressly reserved the right to remove sub-surface coal. Later an act
of the Pennsylvania legislature forbade mining which would cause subsidence of any structure used
for human habitation. The United States Supreme Court denied the plaintiff's request for an injunction
against the mining operations of the coal company beneath his home. The Court held that the surface
owner could not obtain grater rights through the statute than he had bought from the defendant. The
legislature could regulate property only when it was warranted by a sufficient public need. If a
regulation resulted in an actual taking, the government must pay compensation as required by the
Fifth Amendment.
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"if a regulation [went] too far it [would] be recognized as a taking."
Holmes said that a taking occurred when the diminution in the value of
property was great enough AND when "the statute [did] not disclose a
a destruction of the
public interest sufficient to warrant so extensive
' 26
defendant's constitutionally protected rights."
The foundation of the uncompensated takings clause was the historical
right of the sovereign to confer ownership of property on individuals
while preserving certain rights to the property in himself. 27 "Eminent
domain" power was an inherent attribute of the sovereign. 28 The Fifth
Amendment acknowledged the legitimate claim of the sovereign to property taken for public use; but it secured the rights of the property owner
by commanding the sovereign' to pay compensation when any individual
owner bore an unfair burden for the public benefit. The property owner
could seek compensation when the taking was an absolute conversion,
an infliction of permanent injury, or the destruction of value. 29 Furthermore, the property owner could seek relief on the grounds that the sovereign claimed the property for private, not for public use.30
Undeniably, an uncompensated taking occurred when there was a physical invasion by the government for the public benefit under the well
established principles of eminent domain and inverse condemnation. 3
However, courts and scholars have disagreed about whether a zoning
regulation can ever constitute an uncompensated taking, and if it can,
what test to apply to make the determination.32 In Penn Central Transportation Company v. City of New York33 the Supreme Court assessed the
economic impact of a zoning regulation on the property owner and measured the extent of public benefit and private harm. The elements of the
test resembled those used by Holmes in Pennsylvania Coal: the Court
considered a diminution in value along with a balancing of public and
private interests to determine if there was a taking. However, the recent
case Qf Agins v. City of Tiberon3 4 refuted any mechanical application of
this two-part test. Instead it made either prong, by itself, sufficient to
26. Id. at 414.
27. F BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES, & J. BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE 82-104 (1973).
28. U.S. v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 241-42 (1946).
29. Pumeelly v. Green Bay Cop., 80 U.S. 166, 177-78 (1871).
30. H. SCHEIBER, Property Law, Expropriation, and Resource Allocation by Government,
1789-1910, in AMERICAN LAW AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 132, 137 (1978).
31. 438 U.S. at 124.
32. Supra note 2.
33. 438 U.S. 104, 138 (1979). The New York City Landmarks Preservation Commission designated the Grand Central Terminal as a "landmark" and refused the owner's plans to construct a
50-story office building on top of it. The United States Supreme Court held that there was no taking
)ecause the regulation did not interfere with the owner's present use, nor did it prevent him from
ealizing a reasonable rate of return on his investment.
34. 447 U.S. 255.
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establish a regulatory taking. Justice Powell noted that an ordinance
effected a taking if it did not substantially advance legitimate state interests
or if it denied the owner economically viable use of his land. 35 Under
Agins a sufficient decrease in the value of property could constitute a
taking, even if the owner still had full use and enjoyment of it.
Under any test, the Fifth Amendment Property Clause protects the
individual property owner from bearing the cost of government action on
his own; the government must reimburse him when it takes property in
the public interest. 36 As late as the Agins case in 1980, however, the
Court had never awarded damages for a regulatory taking. In Agins the
Court ruled that the property owner had shared with the public the benefits
and burdens of the zoning regulation in question and had suffered no
injustice or unfairness. 37 The Court refused to speculate whether38 damages
would be available when an uncompensated taking did occur.
Theoretically, then, due process analysis and uncompensated taking
analysis should operate independently of each other to determine the
validity of zoning ordinances. A regulation may violate rights given in
both the due process clause and uncompensated takings clause, or it may
deny rights in only one by itself. For example, a regulation serving no
legitimate public purpose may be arbitrary or irrational, thus denying due
process, without actually taking an individual's private property. A regulation may result in a taking if the practical effect is to deny a property
owner any beneficial use of his land; yet if the regulation serves a legitimate public need, it will fall within the bounds of due process rationality.
There is evident overlap in the fairness test which balances public benefit
and private loss. A court may hold a regulation an "irrational" violation
of due process because private loss outweighs public benefit. It may find
an uncompensated taking when a property owner does not share the public
benefits of a regulation and bears an inordinate proportion of its burdens.
However, since the bifurcation of the Pennsylvania Coal standard in
Agins, it is unclear whether the property owner need bear an unfair burden
for a taking to occur; mere diminution in value may be enough. Both the
Hernandez Court and the San Diego dissent address this problem.
35. Id. at 260.
36. 438 U.S. at 125.
37. 447 U.S. at 262. The plaintiff purchased five acres of unimproved land in the City of Tiburon,
California for residential development. Later a state law required the City to prepare a general plan
governing land-use and the development of open-space land; the resulting City ordinance limited
the number of residential one-family dwellings to five for the entire tract. The United States Supreme
Court held that there was no taking because the zoning ordinances substantially advanced the
legitimate state goals of assuring careful and orderly development of residential property. The
ordinances neither limited the best use of the plaintiff's land nor extinguished a fundamental attribute
of ownership. The plaintiff was free to pursue reasonable investment expectations.
38. Id. at 263.
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JUSTICE BRENNAN TAKES A STAND
In 1981 no clear precedent actually granted damages when a zoning
regulation went "too far." The dissenting opinion of Justice Brennan in
San Diego Gas & Electric v. City of San Diego followed the Pennsylvania
Coal tradition in its definition of an uncompensated taking resulting from
an excessive zoning regulation. It also demanded a remedy of damages
consistent with remedies in eminent domain and inverse condemnation. 3 9
San Diego Gas and Electric reached the U.S. Supreme Court after
lengthy litigation in the California courts. The San Diego Gas & Electric
Company owned a 412-acre parcel of land, part of which it held for use
as the site of a nuclear power plant. 4° The City of San Diego rezoned the
property, reducing the number of acres available for industrial use and
designating a portion for acquisition by the City for open space. Voters
turned down a bond issue to provide the open space funds, making the
land unusable by the owners. Subsequently San Diego Gas & Electric
Co. filed a claim in state court alleging that the City had taken its property
without just compensation in violation of the Federal and State Constitutions. The trial court awarded damages for inverse condemnation, but
refused a mandamus claim. The California Court of Appeals affirmed and
the City appealed to the California Supreme Court. That court remanded
the case to the appeals court for reconsideration in light of a recent state
decision that the exclusive remedy for an excessive zoning regulation
was invalidation through mandamus or declaratory relief. The Appeals
Court then reversed the trial court's award of damages, but refused a
mandamus or declaratory relief because some factual disputes were not
addressed
by the trial court. The California Supreme Court denied further
review. 4"
San Diego Gas & Electric appealed to the United States Supreme Court
rather than seek invalidation of the ordinance by the trial court. They
asked whether the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments required the payment
42
of compensation when a regulation took private property for public use.
The company sought damages rather than the mere invalidation of the
zoning regulation. However, the majority of the U.S. Supreme Court
refused to reach the question of monetary relief; the Court held that a
lower court had failed to establish the fact of a taking. 43 The Court noted
in dicta that the question of a monetary remedy was not one to be cast
aside lightly. 44 Justice Rehnquist, in a concurring opinion, agreed that
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

450 U.S. at 653.
Id. at 624.
Id. at 621.
Id. at 623.
Id. at 633.
Id.
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tacit approval of the
there had been no final judgment, but he indicated
45
payment of damages for regulatory takings.
Justices Brennan, Stewart, Marshall, and Powell did not agree that the
California courts had failed to establish the fact of a taking. 46 Brennan's
dissenting opinion argued that the State Court had nothing further to
determine; thus the decision was a final judgment within the requirements
of 28 U.S.C. § 1257.47 Brennan then moved to the question before the
Court and cited both the two part test of Penn Central and the bifurcated
version of Agins.48 Brennan did not dwell on either test. Instead, he relied
on the principle from Pennsylvania Coal that a regulation which went
"too far" effected a taking. 49 For Brennan that occurred when a restriction
destroyed the use and enjoyment of property 0 and "the effects [of a
regulation were to] completely deprive the owner of all or most of his
interest in property.""
Brennan argued that after any taking, the Fifth Amendment required
the payment of damages)2 Regulatory takings might be temporary anc
reversible, but they still entitled the property owner to compensation for
the period during which he suffered the detriment.53 That period started
5 4
with passage of the regulation and ended with recission or amendment.
Justice Brennan chose not to identify such uncompensated takings as "de
facto inverse condemnation," saying instead that the Court was concerned
with a constitutional rule, not the means of implementation chosen by
the states. 5
THE HERNANDEZ DIFFERENCE
When the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari to Hernandez
it incorporated some portions of the Brennan dissent in San Diego into
law. The Hernandez opinion relied heavily on the statement by the San
Diego dissent that a police power regulation effecting a taking required
just compensation. 6 However, the two cases adopted different standards
in defining an uncompensated taking. The San Diego dissent asked whether
an uncompensated taking had occurred which "complete[ly] depriv[ed]
45.
46.
47.
48.

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at
at
at

636.
642.
645-46.
647-48.
649.
652.
653.

at 658.
at 660.
at 654.
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the owner of all or most of his interest in the property." 57 This encompassed destroying the owner's use and enjoyment of the property in order
to promote the public good.5 8 The Fifth Circuit in Hernandez more specifically required that the owner be deprived of "any economically viable
use" of his property. 9 Both allowed compensation for temporary takings,
but the Brennan standard compensated for a loss of the benefits of use
and enjoyment, while the Fifth Circuit would only provide reimbursement
when the owner proved sufficient diminution in the value of the property.
The Brennan standard found its origins in nuisance law. He relied upon
United States v. General Motors Corp. 6° for the proposition that a regulation may not deprive the owner of all or most of his interest in property.
GeneralMotors relied in turn upon earlier railroad nuisance cases holding
that a homeowner and a church congregation could compel a railroad to
pay damages or to purchase their property when noise and pollution denied
them use and enjoyment." In both cases the owners could not peacefully
inhabit their property after the building of a railroad facility. Thus, the
San Diego dissent would award just compensation when a zoning ordinance unfairly deprived an individual property owner of the beneficial
use of his land. This lost use might or might not be associated with a
profitable use of the land. Great diminution in value could help to prove
loss of use, but presumably the owner might demand compensation from
the government for the loss of beneficial use, even if he could sell the
land for a profit or use it for financial gain.
The Brennan standard was consistent with the precedent established
by Justice Holmes in Pennsylvania Coal. Brennan interpreted the Fifth
Amendment to require more than a mere diminution of value to establish
a taking. He included the fairness consideration: the property owner
denied beneficial use should receive compensation for his losses rather
than mere invalidation of the regulation. 62 The fairness consideration
assured that the benefits and burdens of the public use of private property
would be evenly distributed among citizens over the long run. 63 A property
owner could not be asked to accept his interest in the public welfare as
"compensation" when his own loss was too great or to bear more than
his own fair share of the public burden. 64 A regulation might legitimately
57. Id. at 653.
58. Id. at 652.
59. 643 F.2d at 1200.
60. 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945).
61. Richards v. Washington Terminal Co., 233 U.S. 546 (1913); Baltimore & Potomac Railroad
Co. v. Fifth Baptist Church, 108 U.S. 317, 332 (1882).
62. 260 U.S. at 652.
63. See Sax, supra note 26 at 60; Ryckman, supra note 2 at 195-7; Michelman, Property, Utility,
and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of 'Just Compensation' Law, 80 HARV., L.
REV. 1165, 1172 (1967).
64. 450 U.S. at 656.
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prohibit the owner from using his property to injure the health, morals,
or safety of the community without actually "taking" the property for
public use. 65 It might reduce the dollar value of the property. But to
Brennan a regulation went "too far" when it destroyed use or enjoyment,
depriving the owner of most of his interest. 66
Hernandez, however, adopted a narrower stance. It acknowledged that
67
Brennan's reasoning was "applicable with equal force to the 1983 case."
Nevertheless the court adopted one of the two prongs of the bifurcated
Agins test without explanation or notation. Hernandez held that an action
for damages would lie when the zoning regulation denied the owner "any
economically viable use" of this property. Although uncited, the language
came directly from Agins;68 Agins relied on a footnote in Penn Central
for the proposition that there would be a regulatory taking when a use
ceased to be "economically viable." '69 Under the Hernandez standard,
use and enjoyment were of no concern; only sufficient diminution in
value, whether temporary or permanent, was certain to bring damages
and compensation. Nor did the Hernandez court mention balancing interests to achieve fairness. Presumably no public interest was great enough
to justify depriving the owner of any economically viable use of property.
Furthermore, the Hernandez opinion left important questions unanswered when it adopted sufficient diminution-in-value as the standard for
a taking. The court did not clarify whether diminution was the exclusive
requirement for a taking, whether it was the major requirement, or whether
it was one of several requirements, any of which could establish the
taking. If the court was following Agins, there may also be a taking when
a regulation does not substantially advance legitimate state interests, as
required in the other prong of the Agins test. However, if the decision
was based on the San Diego dissent, deprivation of any economical use
might be one means of destroying use and enjoyment; presumably there
would be other ways to do so not encompassed by the opinion. If the
standard was derived from neither opinion, the Fifth Circuit may have
relied instead upon mere reduction in value to the property owner as the
requirement, thereby rejecting any weighing of public gain and private
loss in the determination of a taking. Finally, it is possible that the court
concluded that depriving the owner of any economical use was unfairness
per se, outweighing any public need for regulation of the property. If this
is true, a plaintiff restrained from a noxious use-such as running a house
of prostitution in an isolated desert community-might claim a Fifth
Amendment taking even if the property was otherwise of little value.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

438
450
643
447
438

U.S.
U.S.
F.2d
U.S.
U.S.

at 144; 260 U.S. at 413-14.
at 653.
at 1200.
at 260.
at 138 n. 36.
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Moreover, the Hernandezconclusion was contrary to precedent holding
that mere diminution in value was not enough to constitute a Fifth Amendment taking .70 It ignored a long tradition of nuisance cases which inquired
into the public need for a regulation. The opinion rode roughshod over
Pennsylvania Coal's search for a public interest "sufficient" to destroy a
property owner's rights .71 It relied on a footnote in Penn Central related
to economically viable use, but ignored that case's holding which concluded that restrictions imposed should be "substantially related to the
promotion of the general welfare. "72 Nor did Hernandez make mention
of Brennan's emphasis on the destruction of use and enjoyment. It will
be difficult to measure the property owner's loss without knowning whether
to include that destruction in the equation.
Additionally, neither the Hernandez opinion nor the San Diego dissent
clarified the question left by Pennsylvania Coal of how far a regulation
must go to go "too far." Hernandez never defined denial of any economically use; a precursor case of Penn Central Transportation Co. v.
City of New York stated that such a denial was not present when an owner
could make a "reasonable return" on his investment and could develop
nearby parcels owned by him.73 Hernandez claimed he could not make
a profit on his land without a zoning change, but the trial court never
made that factual determination. Moreover, in San Diego Justice Brennan
failed to define what constituted depriving an owner of most of his interest
in property. The city regulation preserving the land for open space rendered the property useless in the absence of bond monies; still the majority
remanded the case for determination of the taking question.
Hernandez and the San Diego dissent are similar in their failure to
apply traditional due process analysis. Neither asked whether the regulation in question was irrational, and neither acknowledged that an uncompensated taking could occur along with a due process violation. The
San Diego dissent might have asked whether the same excessive unfairness to the property owner was a violation of due process, thus automatically invalidating the regulation and making damages available for
the interim period. The Hernandez court might have stated that denial of
any economical use demonstrated an illegitimate means of achieving a
designated end, bringing the same result. Neither opinion went that far.
Hernandez merely established that a temporary taking would begin when
a municipality received notice of the loss of economically viable use and
failed to respond reasonably to such notice .74 Hernandez placed the burden
70. Supra note 25.
71. 260 U.S. at 414.

72. 438 U.S. at 137, 138.
73. id. at 136, 137. But see 438 U.S. at 149 n. 13.
74. 643 F.2d at 1200.
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on the regulator, not the court, to invalidate a regulation which deprived
a property owner of just compensation and due process.
Furthermore, both did conclude in footnotes that a regulation enacted
with no legitimate "public use" could bring damages in a § 1983 due
process action under the Fourteenth Amendment. 75 The property owner
retaining possession of his land would suffer no uncompensated taking;
still he could seek damages in addition to invalidation by proving that
he had suffered the damages provided for by § 1983. Carried to their
logical conclusion, both footnotes suggest that a property owner might
seek damages for temporary losses caused by a regulation which violated
his due process rights, even if there was no taking. No claimant has filed
a § 1983 claim both for invalidation and for damages arising from a due
process violation; if upheld, such claims will significantly alter due process property claims.
PRACTICAL APPLICATION

As a practical matter, however, the future is uncertain for a property
owner wishing to bring suit against a municipality due to an excessive
zoning regulation. The traditionally successful method of attack has always been through the due process clause;76 few cases alleging an unconstitutional taking through regulation have succeeded. 77 After Hernandez
any action or inaction which makes land unusable until further government
decisionmaking will fall in the group of potential claims for damages.
The property owner may have the best chance of success when a city
sets aside land for open space, but does not appropriate the necessary
funds to purchase it.78 Total failure to complete a zoning change or undue
delay in responding to a zoning request also may pose clear risks of
liability for a city, as might a regulation whose purpose is later public
condemnation at a low price. It will be difficult, however, to prove
municipal liability for damages in completed zoning actions which simply
reduce the landowner's profit or merely "downzone." The courts will
need to draw a new line somewhere between a regulation which causes
a mere reduction in land value and one which makes land wholly unusable.
The Hernandez case did little more than establish that judges could consider denial of any economical use when making the determination. The
requirements are still ill-defined and only case by case litigation will
reveal them.
Both Hernandez and San Diego are certain to elicit some concern in
75. 450 U.S. at 656 n. 23, 643 F.2d at 1200 n. 26.

76. 450 U.S. at 630, 640.
77. Ryckman, supra note 2 at 388-90.
78. See the recent case of Burrows v. City of Keene, 121 N.H. 590, 432 A.2d 15 (1981).
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the ranks of municipal government. For the first time cities will be liable
for money damages when they enact zoning ordinances which go "too
far"; in some instances, at least, they will be unable to rely on the remedy
which invalidates the ordinance. Public officials will protest that the new
uncertainty of financial liability may cause budget problems and may
inhibit the exercise of effective land use planning for the public benefit.
They will allege that those least needing compensation, the large land
developers, will bring the majority of claims. Cities will have to guess
at the dollar value of potential claims and either put the funds aside or
make appropriate insurance arrangements.
Justice Brennan pointed out in San Diego that such concerns have no
bearing on constitutional analysis. 79 The value placed on private property
rights by the Constitution simply commands that municipalities raise the
funds needed to purchase property for use in the public interest. Certainly
the government may choose to act for the public good, but it must pay
its way. Justice Brennan was uncertain that the probable consequences
of the San Diego dissent would be to impede planners anyway. He thought
it might minimize overzealous regulatory attempts and help produce more
rational decisionmaking.'o
Ultimately, the result of the reasoning in both cases may be the strengthening of individual rights against arbitrary government action. The tangible right to hold real property is secured by no fewer than two clauses
in the Fifth Amendment, one protecting due process and the other forbidding the taking of property without compensation. Individually each
citizen has greater protection from government action which"compensates"
him merely by allowing him to partake of the public good. As a group
all citizens undoubtedly will have to pay more in compensation to vested
land interests to further legitimate and desired public objectives. Future
cases will reveal how expensive it will be for a city regulating in the
public interest to pursue publicly accepted goals. In the final analysis,
however, that damage to the public good may be subtle and immeasurable
in dollars. The Hernandez decision may hamper progressive land use
planning attempts to make significant changes in the status quo of zoning
in a growing or changing community.
CONCLUSION
Despite inevitable difficulties of application, the San Diego and Hernandez cases establish the groundwork for major changes in property
litigation. Property owners aggrieved by zoning regulations may choose
among several courses: they may file an action in state court similar to
79. 450 U.S. at 660-61.
80. Id. at 661 n. 26.
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an inverse condemnation action or they may file a § 1983 action in state
or federal court. The § 1983 action may proceed in federal court concurrently with the state cause of action. Any of these claims may seek
relief by requesting damages equal to the value of the property or the
economic harm done by a temporary taking, even. if the regulation is
reversed by later action. The aggrieved property owner may seek the
damages for the uncompensated taking, but he may also claim them for
a due process violation under § 1983. Hernandez suggests that property
owners will prevail in the uncompensated taking claim when government
action or inaction denies them the right to use their land. As yet undetermined is how extensive the interference must be to deny the property
owner any economically viable use. Also untested is the application of
§ 1983 to a due process property claim.
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